THE FACTUAL MATRIX OF SAHADEVAN CASE

Three accused, including the two appellants, made confession before the president of a Panchayat in the presence of a witness, stating that they had murdered the deceased by strangulating him, and thereafter set his body on fire after putting kerosene oil on it. The said statement of the accused was reduced in writing and after obtaining their signatures thereon and appending his own signature, the same was handed over to the police along with the custody of the accused, whereupon the investigating officer (IO) formally arrested all the three accused.

On the basis of confessional statement, the IO recovered three articles – a moped, a bottle smelling kerosene and a match box – allegedly used in the commission of crime. A charge sheet was filed against all the three accused, and they were tried under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, at the trial, the accused chose not to lead any defence.

The trial court, based on evidence, both oral and documentary, convicted all the three accused under Section 302 of IPC and awarded them sentence of imprisonment for life. Dismissal of appeal against the trial court judgment by the High Court led the two appellants to prefer further appeal before the Supreme Court. In the absence of any eyewitness, the conviction in this case was based on circumstantial evidence that primarily revolved around the extrajudicial confession made by the accused. For determining the evidentiary value of the extra-judicial confession, the Supreme Court, in the first instance, reflected upon its intrinsic character and then culled the factors from the settled precedents of the apex court that provided credence in relying upon such extra-judicial confessional statements.

Admittedly, the court said, according to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, ‘extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence.’ Nevertheless, ‘there is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction.’ Still, it should be proved ‘like any other fact and in accordance with law’.

Bearing these precepts in mind, the three factors, considered as condition precedent for relying upon extra-judicial confession as an admissible piece of evidence were capable of forming basis of conviction of an accused, may be abstracted from Sahadevan as under –

• Voluntariness: Extra-judicial confession should be voluntary. It should not be result of any inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It should also be ensured that it has been made ‘in a fit state of mind.’
• Truthfulness: The veracity of the extrajudicial confession should be affirmed, for no conviction can be based only on the sole basis thereof. Moreover, the confessional statement should be clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. In short, it should inspire confidence. (c) Corroboration: Extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by a chain of ‘cogent circumstances’ or some other material on record to support it. It should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.

When these judicially propounded precepts were applied to the fact matrix of Sahadevan, including principally the extrajudicial confessional statement that constituted the prime basis of conviction, the Supreme Court unreservedly set aside the conviction and the sentence of imprisonment for life of all the three accused awarded by the High Court, including even that of the non-appealing convict.

Acts of glaring omissions/commissions that deprived the extra-judicial-confession document of its evidentiary value included the following:

• Omission of examination of the main witness in whose presence confessional statement was made and recorded instantly denuded the document of its credibility, more specially when not only its very execution was denied by the accused by making a statement under Section 313 of the IPC, but also adding that they were falsely implicated in the case. Under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, such an examination is imperative ‘for un-wrapping the cover of ban against admissibility of statement of accused to the police.
• Corroborative evidence was found to be woefully weak and disappointing to wit as per the autopsy report, the person died in the morning of a particular day, the same deceased person was however stated to be seen alive by the prosecution witness in the afternoon of the same day.
• Failure to connect and establish linkage between the articles recovered and the incident of crime as alleged to have been committed was evident. On the contrary, as per the forensic report, no kerosene was found on the body of the deceased or his belongings, such as clothes and chappals. Omission on this count, said the Supreme Court, creates doubt ‘as to whether the recovered items were at all and actually used in the commission of the crime’.
• Relying on the theory of ‘last seen together’ was least justified as much as it failed to ‘complete the chain of circumstances to record a finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused’.
• The ‘essential’ cause of murder by the accused (which included the brother-in-law of the deceased), as stated in the confessional statement, was the ‘ill treatment’ by the deceased of his wife. Such a statement was completely falsified by the testimony of the deceased’s wife herself, and who even in her cross examination did not yield ‘the fact of alleged cruelties.’