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The Battle for Ownership Miramax vs Tarantino

The Battle for Ownership Miramax vs Tarantino

Ownership, as a concept, is simple enough to understand. Or at least it used to be, back when the world and all our possessions within it were physical and tangible. It is arguably easier to establish and assert one’s ownership over physical items. Complexities started creeping in when the concept of ownership was extended to intangible items, with the growing recognition of an owner’s rights in their ‘intellectual’ property. While intricate laws were created to recognize these rights, to both encourage creativity and protect the economic rights of creators and owners of intangible items, these laws need to undergo constant development for numerous reasons, whether for the sake of progression and/ or to keep up with and address human and technological evolution.

As an owner, you can or are said to have the legitimate ‘right’ and ‘title’ to sell (and part with ownership) or loan (while retaining ownership) your possessions to others. Naturally, this means that no one else can sell or loan your belongings to others. The concept of sale, when extended to intellectual property, is known as an ‘assignment’ of rights, and a loan is known as a ‘license’ of rights. The assignment and/or license in relation to intellectual property can get complicated due to the multiplicity of rights contained within this intangible concept as also the multitude of, often creative, ways in which different intellectual property or parts of the intellectual property can be exploited.

The on-going dispute between Miramax and Tarantino highlights this complexity.

As the dispute is concerning a film, let us examine the rights in relation to such a work. A film is a combination of individual contributions that come together in the form of a recording, of all visuals and sounds that are produced. This includes a story (as also script/screenplay and dialogues), music (background music, songs, the lyrics, musical compositions and vocal performances of the singers), performances of the actors and dancers, images, artwork and any other ‘works’1 capable of copyright protection and those that are not capable of protection such as the contributions of Cinematographers, Directors, Choreographers, Action Directors, etc.

The (Indian) Copyright Act, 1957 (Act) provides that the person at whose instance a ‘cinematograph film’2 is made – which is usually a producer3 (as commonly understood and also defined in the Act), is the first owner of copyright4 of the cinematograph film.

Being the first owner of copyright, and by default, the owner (producer) has the exclusive right to do, or authorize the doing of, specific acts, in respect of the film5 or any substantial part of the film6.

While the Act clarifies that the recording7 of the film, as a whole/ amalgam, is owned8 by the producer, the issue that often arises for consideration is as to who owns the rights in the “underlying works” on the basis of which, the film is produced/created. As in the case of a film, the default “first owner” in the case of underlying works is the individual natural person referred to as the “author” of the work.

The Act and also copyright legislation in other parts of the world, however, allow the “author” to part with his/her ownership – assign it or license it – by a contract entered into with the producer. This has led to an “industry-practice” of deals where individual authors are either contractually commissioned by the producer to create their works, or such works are contractually assigned to the producer. Such a contract enables the producer to also become the owner of all the various, individual, underlying works, that comprise the film.

Resultantly, the producer will have the exclusive right to (itself or permit third parties to) use, exploit and monetize the film and all individual components of the film, in an unlimited and unrestricted manner, for the term of copyright. This can be done by exploiting the film in theatres, through broadcast and digital platforms, creating derivative works such as prequels, sequels, remakes, spin-offs, exploiting the music individually, creating merchandise based on the film’s characters, promotional material, artwork, images, posters and all other existing and future means of exploitation, which today, would also mean, the creation and monetization of non-fungible tokens (NFTs).

This is where the seemingly straightforward narrative/understanding of ownership ends. The world of commerce, especially today, does not work in such a simplistic manner. Enter the real world where (i) films are jointly produced by multiple producers who contractually agree to share or divide rights; (ii) certain acclaimed contributors (authors, composers, actors, etc.) do not agree to part with all their rights in the works that they have developed, and in such cases, producers agree to carve out certain rights/monetary benefits, which are reserved with the contributors; and (iii) depending on a party’s stature in the industry and hence their bargaining/negotiation power, rights can be structured, shared, divided and/ or jointly owned by multiple parties in many permutations and combinations.9

As one can imagine, the potential for disputes occurring, when rights are shared, is quite high, and more so when the terms of the contract that pertain to joint ownership or the division or sharing of rights are not clearly demarcated and defined. It becomes crucial to ensure that there is no ambiguity or overlap of rights in the contracts. Further, as we will see evidently from the dispute between Miramax and Tarantino, even when parties attempt to divide and clarify the division of rights carefully, they cannot always foresee and provision for new formats and futuristic technologies of exploitation of the rights, which could not have been contemplated, at the time of executing the contract.

THE DISPUTE

In November 2021, Quentin Tarantino, one of Hollywood’s most well-known directors, who also wrote and directed the film ‘Pulp Fiction’ that was released by Miramax in 1994 (Film), announced a project called ‘Tarantino NFTs’ and his plan to make, ‘mint’ and auction, 7 NFTs from his original hand-written screenplay of the Film (Pulp Fiction NFTs). Each NFT was intended to contain “one-of-a-kind” content that has “never been seen or heard before”, including digital images of the uncut and handwritten script of the Film, containing Tarantino’s original markings, misspellings, and cross-outs, along with secret content and audio commentary from Tarantino himself. The website10 provides detailed information regarding the content of the Pulp Fiction NFTs (Website).

Shortly after Tarantino’s announcement, Miramax sent him a cease-and-desist letter asserting their rights in the Film, to which Tarantino’s lawyers responded, claiming that Tarantino had retained certain “Reserved Rights” in his agreement with Miramax (regarding the production and financing of the Film), dated 23 June 1993 (1993 Agreement), and that such Reserved Rights sufficiently covered his intended plans to create and sell the Pulp Fiction NFTs. This resulted in Miramax filing a detailed complaint11 against Tarantino on 16th November 2021 (Complaint) in the United States District Court (Court).

To understand Miramax’s contentions in the Complaint, it is necessary to understand the division of rights between Miramax and Tarantino, as contained in the 1993 Agreement12, which states that Tarantino “hereby grants to Miramax for the “Territory” (universe) and “Term” (perpetuity) all rights (including all copyrights and trademarks) in and to the Film (and all elements thereof in all stages of development and production) now or hereafter known including without limitation the right to distribute the Film in all media now or hereafter known (theatrical, non-theatrical, all forms of television, home video, etc.) but excluding only the following rights (“Reserved Rights”) which are reserved to Tarantino: soundtrack album, music publishing, live performance, print publication (including without limitation screenplay publication, “making of” books, comic books and novelization, in audio and electronic formats as well, as applicable), interactive media, theatrical and television sequel and remake rights, and television series and spinoff rights. Exercise of certain of the Reserved Rights is subject to restrictions set forth elsewhere in this agreement. Tarantino shall have the right to use the title of the Film in connection with the exploitation of the Reserved Rights. For the purpose of this agreement, “interactive media” means any interactive device or mechanism, such as a computer game based on the Film, which may include literary, or character elements used in the Film but shall not be a substantial replication or viewing of the Film. Interactive media rights, if not hereafter acquired by Miramax, shall he subject to a holdback to be negotiated in good faith, with a particular view to avoiding competition with home video. Miramax may publish for promotional purposes excerpts up to 7500 words from the screenplay on a not-for-sale basis.”.

In the Complaint, Miramax alleges, inter alia, the broad contentions below:

  • Tarantino had, under the 1993 Agreement, granted and assigned nearly all his rights to the Film and all its elements, in all stages of development and production, to Miramax; and
  • Tarantino’s Reserved Rights are limited, ‘far too narrow for him to unilaterally produce, market and sell the Pulp Fiction NFTs’ and ‘do not contain any forward-looking language’ and the Reserved Rights were further “subject to restrictions set forth elsewhere in the 1993 Agreement.”. Hence, Tarantino’s acts are not covered under the Reserved Rights and the right to sell NFTs of any excerpts or any versions of the screenplay of the Film is owned by Miramax.
  • Based on these allegations, Miramax claimed an order of restraint/damages on account of breach of contract, copyright infringement, trademark infringement and unfair competition.

IN RESPONSE, TARANTINO DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS, BY STATING THAT
  • Miramax is aware that Tarantino has every right to publish portions of his original handwritten screenplay for the Film, which is a personal creative treasure that he has kept private for decades, and the 1993 Agreement clearly and unambiguously grants him the opportunity to do so, as those rights were carefully identified, bargained for and memorialized;
  • Tarantino did not establish the Website and Tarantino does not have any plans to distribute, or authorize distribution of, Miramax’s intellectual property via NFTs;
  • Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction NFTs would contain a digital scan of portions of Tarantino’s original screenplay and for each Pulp Fiction NFT, there would be a kind of ‘book cover’ that will be a static original drawing inspired by some element from the relevant scene, and that images from the Film would not be used in this regard and Tarantino was acting within his Reserved Rights including the right to publish the screenplay.
  • The first question that arises here is does the minting and sale of the Pulp Fiction NFTs by Tarantino actually fall within the interpretation of the definition of ‘Publication’13, even if such an act could not have been contemplated, at the time of the agreement?

    Blockchain did not exist in 1993 and NFTs could not have been contemplated back then. It would be true, from Miramax’s perspective, that at the time of the agreement, the meaning of publication and what was intended to be permitted as publication, would not have taken NFTs into consideration. That said, Tarantino did specifically reserve the right to screenplay publication (in audio and electronic formats) and to use the title of the Film in connection with his Reserved Rights.

    Was it necessary then, as Miramax contends, for Tarantino to have also included forward looking language to cover future technologies?14 And in the absence of having done that, is Tarantino’s right, to publish the screenplay, limited to technologies that were in existence only until 1993? What then of NFTs and newer, emerging and future technologies…does Miramax automatically own the right to create, mint and sell NFTs of the screenplay and Tarantino’s other reserved rights (which Miramax does not, in fact, own) and exploit them through all newer, emerging and future technologies after 1993?

    While this battle for ownership continues, and these questions will be answered in March15 next year, there are two learnings from this dispute, to be considered from an Indian law perspective:

    • “Owners” of content should proactively review and examine their existing contracts, to understand whether their rights have been captured clearly; whether they are wide or narrowly worded; and whether, there is a need to consider re-opening clauses to negotiate and clarify their rights pertaining to NFTs and other emerging and future technologies; and
    • These questions must be considered and answered for future deals, in light of the prevailing provisions of the Act. All parties would definitely be advised to exercise extreme care, at the negotiation and drafting stages, to protect and determine the ownership of these “future media”/“future exploitation” rights contractually, especially in view of the clear and unambiguous language of the second proviso introduced to Section 18 of the Act in 2012, which mandates that no … assignment shall be applied to any medium or mode of exploitation of the work which did not exist or was not in commercial use at the time when the assignment was made, unless the assignment specifically referred to such medium or mode of exploitation of the work.
    • It is certainly the need of the hour for lawyers to work together with business and technical experts, to understand where technology is headed in terms of exploitation, as far as may be conceivable, and to provision for it, as creatively as possible!.

About Author

Meghana Chandorkar

Meghana Chandorkar is a Partner at TMT Law Practice. An Alumnus of ILS Law College, Pune, Meghana has over a decade of experience as an Intellectual Property and Media & Entertainment lawyer. Her core areas of expertise include structuring, drafting, and negotiating agreements, and providing advice and opinions, pertaining to the creation, maintenance, protection, acquisition, and exploitation of intellectual property rights. She is skilled in copyright, media and entertainment, broadcast, trademark, and contract law, and she has been recognized as a professional whose advice is valued in providing creative legal solutions and advice to clients.