There is a clear distinction between a merely ‘erroneous’ decision and a decision, which can be characterized as vitiated by “error apparent”. In today’s times, where much emphasis is upon number, in as much, reducing the pendency of cases, it completely escapes attention of all and sundry that decisions vitiated by “error apparent” dent the judicial system causing irreparable injury to people than mere pendency.

I must not be considered to be against quick dispensation of justice, but I am certainly an advocate of considered and just dispensation of justice for justice itself means solemn consideration of the dispute and resolution thereof within the realms of law.

The courts being the guardians and interpreter of the law, pious duty is cast upon them by the Constitution to do it judiciously with due consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case, so as to do justice between the parties. However, it turns out to be grim situation, when cases are decided but are vitiated by error apparent causing complete miscarriage of justice, more so, when such decisions are by the Supreme Court or by High Courts, instances of which are not uncommon in the prevailing times. To make a mention, in this respect, I may invite attention to a recent judgment of a High Court, where the High Court by its judgment, on the one hand, held that appeal under section 10-F of Companies Act of 1956 was maintainable because the order passed by the Chairman, Company Law Board was ‘judicial order’ since he decided a lis between the parties as to whether the transfer application of the appellant seeking transfer of case from one Bench to another for concluding final hearing could be allowed; while, on the other hand, held that the Chairman did not have the power to transfer cases between Benches inter se. It completely escaped High Court’s attention that when the order of the CLB was a judicial one, then in exercise of inherent power under Regulation 44, the Chairman, who would be deemed to be CLB, could very well injudicial exercise transfer pending cases between Benches, inter se.

However, the view taken by the High Court, though not only caused great damage to the litigants therein, where the hearing consumed about 24 hours of precious judicial time, and an hour more was needed to conclude hearing and pleadings being exchanged to the level of sur-sur-rejoinder, when the Member hearing the case was transferred to another Bench; but created perpetual blockade for the CLB in regulating its own procedure in administrative exigencies. It may be relevant to state that the Chairman rejected the said transfer application on extraneous grounds expressing no opinion or even whisper about the statutory power to transfer cases between Benches inter se. In fact, the Chairman presumed his power to transfer case between benches inter se.

Thus, it is this aspect, which requires great introspection, which is cause for miscarriage or frustration of justice; whereas, pendency merely being accountable to delay, but not substantial damage commonly.

Justice implies doing substantial justice and not merely reducing pendency in an accelerated manner. It means balancing the interest of the parties to secure the ends of justice.